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Abstract
The contributions of innovations, factor endowments and
institutions to American industrialization are examined
through analysing the rise of the American portland cement
industry. Minerals abundance contributed in multiple ways
to the spectacular rise of the industry from the 1890s.
However, the results of a structural econometric analysis of
entry suggests geological surveys, institutions highlighted by
David and Wright, played a contributing rather than critical
role in the American portland cement industry overcoming
incumbent European portland cement and American natural
cement producers.
1
1 Introduction
The origins of American industrial success have long been debated. While
early work emphasized the eﬀects of the US Civil War, subsequent research fo-
cussed on the interaction between innovation, factor endowments, and other
characteristics of the American economy (Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2000). The
distinctively capital intensive and standardized American production tech-
nology was explained as resulting from relative labor scarcity and a relatively
even distribution of income. The rate of innovation was encouraged by the
increasing scale of markets due to immigration and falling transportation and
communication costs. Most recently Wright (1990) argues that the origins
of the rise of the United States to international industrial leadership lay in
its abundant mineral resources rather than scarce labor relative to capital or
exogenous innovations. This abundance resulted not from a more extensive
endowment but from a more extensive exploration and exploitation of that
endowment. This resulted, argues David and Wright (1997), from a com-
bination of liberal property rights, public geological research and extensive
university-industry links. How these institutions (and to a lesser extent the
factors highlighted by the earlier literature) created a competitive advantage
for American ﬁrms, when competing with European ﬁrms, beyond presuming
they lowered costs for American ﬁrms, has not been directly examined.
The American portland cement industry is an excellent case for such
an examination. It is a minerals-intensive industry. Portland cement is
manufactured by burning, using mineral fuels, limestone and clay in large
kilns. Secondly, the industry rose to prominence during the 1890s — the
decade Wright identiﬁes as the beginning of international leadership. Finally,
despite its highly visible role, in the form of concrete, in construction and
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urbanization, with the exception of Marchildon (1994), the cement industry
is relatively neglected by economic historians.
The ﬁrst step in our analysis is to review the development of the cement
industry. We ﬁnd the successful commercialization and rapid diﬀusion of the
rotary kiln was the main development that enabled American manufacturers
to replace the previously dominant natural and imported portland cement.
It was the temporary abundance of fuel oil that enabled the experimentation
to solve the operating problems of the rotary kiln that had previously pre-
vented its commercialization by its English inventors. Hence, this industry
is another example of an industry which achieved industrial success based
on mineral abundance. However, the institutions highlighted by David and
Wright were not directly involved in these developments, though there is
anecdotal evidence of their playing other signiﬁcant roles in the development
of the industry.
In the second step of our analysis we econometrically analyze the con-
tribution of public geological research. Published research on raw materials
for cement production would have lowered entry costs. Hence, we estimate a
structural model of entry, at the county level, in the portland cement indus-
try to determine if entry was more likely in counties with more information
on raw materials, and in states where geological surveys had been active
for longer. We ﬁnd, at best, a weak systematic relationship between entry
and these controls for the contributions of geological surveys. This suggests
that for the cement industry, public geological research played a contributing
rather than a systematic critical role in its rise to industrial success. This does
not rule out though that these institutions, as well as other institutions such
as universities, transportation improvements and testing laboratories, were
critical in diﬀerent locations depending on the problems that arose there.
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2 Testing the institutional origins of indus-
trial success
In three papers Wright and David argue the origin of American industrial
success was the national ability to locate and develop its abundant mineral
resources. These resources were then converted into manufactured goods
that were exported (Wright, 1990, 1999; David and Wright, 1997). David
and Wright (1997) argue this ability results from three institutional features
of the US economy: liberal property rights on minerals; state and federal
geological surveys, and; an extensive mining education system with close
industry links. Wright (1999) speciﬁcally emphasizes the national scale of the
learning and the importance of size. David and Wright place the geological
surveys around the start of these developments:
Provision of geological information was perhaps the most impor-
tant initial step in the collective enterprise of resource discovery
and exploitation (David and Wright, 1997, p. 223).
Testing the impact of the institutions as a whole would probably require
a cross-country comparison with enormous data requirements. The grad-
ual development of these institutions and their impacts over time also poses
problems for determining their impact from time series data. However, two
features of the state and federal geological surveys make it more likely that
we can identify their impact. First, as their reports identify the location
of resources, they potentially have speciﬁc local impacts in terms of whether
these resources are developed. Secondly, the timing of their operations can be
determined and, as demonstrated in Table 1, there is considerable variation
across regions in starting dates and periods operated by 1890. Hence, we can
analyse if diﬀerences in the extent to which the geological surveys identiﬁed
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raw materials suitable for cement production, as well as general diﬀerences
in the nature of the geological surveys, systematically inﬂuenced the devel-
opment of the Portland cement industry over diﬀerent locations within the
United States.
However, we need to consider if there are other institutions that might
have aﬀected the spatial development of the industry. One complementary
institution to those identiﬁed in David and Wright, mentioned in Wright
(1990), is that a transportation network is required before resources can be
developed. Meyer (1989) argues the development of the railroad network
plays an important role in the industrialization of the Midwest. Calculations
from U.S. Department of Interior (1883, 1895) suggest total US railroad
mileage constructed doubles between 1870 and 1880 and almost doubles again
between 1880 and 1890. In addition Puﬀert (2000) argues the importance of,
during this period, the railroad network adopting a standard gauge. While
the factors highlighted by David and Wright are relevant, the rise to success
also requires the joining up of the transportation network so the resource
intensive exports could be shipped from the midwest where they were made,
as in Irwin (2003). This institution is complementary, though, as without US
manufacturing having some other advantage, transportation improvements
that carried American goods to the world could have just as easily carried
European goods to the midwest driving out American manufacturers.
3 The rise of the American Portland cement
industry
Cement is the powder which is combined with water to make a mortar and
combined with sand and aggregate to make concrete. It is manufactured
by burning a mixture of limestone and clay, or similar materials, in a large
5
kiln. The burnt material, referred to as clinker, is then ground to make ce-
ment. The cement plant is usually built next to the raw materials. Hence,
it is a mineral-intensive industry, relying on both minerals for raw materials
and mineral fuel for processing. In 1890 there were three sets of sources of
supply of cement to the United States. The largest supplier, 77% of con-
sumption, was the domestic natural cement manufacturers, who used raw
materials found naturally mixed in roughly the right proportions. The sec-
ond largest supplier, 20% of consumption, were European manufacturers of
portland cement — mainly from England and Germany where portland ce-
ment had been developed and all technological innovations had been made
til then. Manufacturing portland cement requires combining raw materials,
not naturally mixed, in speciﬁc proportions and with more extensive pro-
cessing than natural cement. Portland cement was produced in the United
States from around 1873 in the Lehigh Valley, Pennsylvania, and a few other
locations, but in 1890 just 3% of cement consumed in the United States was
portland cement manufactured there.
Table 2 demonstrates that the American portland cement industry rose
to industrial leadership during the 1890s, the critical period identiﬁed by
Wright. The second column demonstrates an enormous growth in American
cement consumption from 2.26 million barrels in 1880 to 90.07 million barrels
in 1910. Based on estimates reported in the 1918 Cement chapter, in 1913 the
United States was, internationally, the single largest cement producer with
43% of international production, the next largest being Germany with 19%.
Column three demonstrates that the price of portland cement fell by more
than a half between 1890 and 1913, with most of the fall occurring by 1902.
The real fall is even larger if quality improvements are taken into account.
Columns four to six demonstrate that how domestic natural cement and
6
imported cement (almost exclusively portland) were replaced by domestic
portland cement. Despite almost complete import replacement, column seven
shows cement never becomes a large export industry.
While there were forces increasing the demand for domestic cement, as is
discussed below, a simultaneous halving of the real price requires a substan-
tial decline in production costs. Contemporary sources and technological
histories all highlight the successful commercialization and rapid diﬀusion
of the rotary kiln during the 1890s as reducing costs and increasing qual-
ity suﬃcient to make American manufacture competitive (Marchildon, 1994;
Stanger and Blount, 1901) The rotary kiln was ﬁrst patented in England, in
1877, and improved on there, most notably in 1885 by Frederick Ransome,
but had not been commercially successful there (Francis, 1977). So, in 1890
all imported cement and nearly all portland cement produced in the United
States was manufactured using English or German-designed vertical kilns.
The ﬁrst successful application of the Ransome kiln was in 1889, also in the
Lehigh Valley, by the Atlas Portland Cement Co. Stanger and Blount, En-
glish engineers who assisted with the unsuccessful attempts to develop the
rotary kiln, when discussing why successful development happened in the
United States and not England state:
In this task they were much aided by the fact they could use
petroleum — a fuel too dear to be employed here. The ease with
which the temperature of the kiln could be controlled when a
jet of burning petroleum was the source of heat allowed many
somewhat crude attempts to reach a qualiﬁed success. (Stanger
and Blount, 1901, p. 57)
The sources of this abundant and cheap crude oil were recent discoveries of
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oil ﬁelds at Lima, Ohio, and Los Angeles, California, where the oil contained
impurities that made it unusable for illumination so it was used for fuel
(Williamson, 1963) The dependence on using crude oil as a fuel initially
limited the diﬀusion of the rotary kiln (Giron, 1893, p. 213). Entrants
using the rotary kiln before 1898 mainly occurred in northern Ohio, southern
California and the Lehigh and Hudson valleys. Following the adaption in the
late 1890s, also at the Atlas Portland Cement Co., of the rotary kiln to use the
much cheaper powdered coal as a fuel, the rotary kiln rapidly diﬀused widely
as the Atlas Portland Cement Co. was unable to prevent other companies
from inventing around their innovation (Hadley, 1945). The rotary kiln also
quickly diﬀused back to Europe (Francis, 1977; Lathbury and Spackman,
1902). Contemporary sources emphasize substantial savings in labor costs
through the mechanization of handling raw materials, output and fuel. They
also note an increase in the speed and scale of production. Calculations
by Stanger and Blount comparing manufacturing costs between American
rotary plants, American rotary technology using English prices and English
technology suggest even then that American ﬁrms had cost advantage due
to lower fuel costs.
Note that the eﬀect on costs is likely to be greater than that suggested
by the fall in the price as two forces were increasing demand for cement that
would have driven the price up to some extent. First, demand was expanding
due to the diﬀusion, primarily from Europe, of the technology required for
construction using reinforced concrete. The 1897 Cement chapter refers to
excess demand in Europe as restricting the supply of exports to the United
States. Skempton (1963) argues that reinforced concrete, though developed
in the 1850s, was not really practical until the 1880s when German portland
cements reached a certain strength. Condit (1960) documents the increas-
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ing range of applications to which concrete, and then reinforced concrete is
applied in the United States from the late 1870s, and particularly from the
late 1880s — initially, mainly, in non-building construction such as dams and
bridges. The work of Wermiel (2000) suggests increasing urban demand for
cement from the 1890s with the requirements by various cities that tall build-
ings be ﬁreproof. This results in the diﬀusion of the skeleton frame building,
featuring concrete walls around an iron or steel frame.
The second potential factor increasing prices was an increase in eﬀective
protection. Eﬀective protection fell from 1861 to 1890 as while tariﬀ rates re-
mained constant, transport costs fell considerably, as documented by Harley
(1988). Lesley (1924) note that cement imports came to California, relatively
cheaply, as ballast for sailing ships. After 1890, eﬀective protection falls and
then rises. In 1890 the ad valorem tariﬀ of 20% is replaced by a tariﬀ of 30.4
cents per barrel, which at 1890 prices is a cut to 15%. But as the price of ce-
ment falls, the equivalent tariﬀ rate rises to over 30% by 1904. Furthermore,
over the 1890s, transport costs may have risen. The 1894 Cement chapter
notes an increase in the transport cost of cement to Chicago. The literature
on the transition from sail to steam is suggestive that the use of sail for bulk
freights (and therefore the use of solid ballast) ceased by the early 1900s at
the latest and, for the Atlantic routes, possibly much earlier (Harley, 1971).
3.1 Institutional Origins
Statements by cement manufacturers to the 1883 Tariﬀ Commission refer
to claims by importers that portland cement could not be produced in the
United States because of a lack of chalk (as used in Europe) though the
manufacturers also state suitable raw materials are believed to be widely
available. Benjamin Miller also refers to the belief that there was no chalk,
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or similar materials, as a reason for the slow development of the industry
(Tariﬀ Commission, 1883, p. 705-708, p. 2275-2280; Miller, 1930). Both
state geological surveys and the United States Geological Survey showed
considerable interest in providing information on the raw materials for cement
manufacture.
The interest by state geological surveys in supplying information on raw
materials for cement manufacturing is demonstrated by the results of search-
ing 30 geological survey reports from 18 states from 1837 to 1878 for ref-
erences to cement, hydraulic limestone and water-lime. The results of this
review are summarized in Table 3. Each column is associated with a diﬀerent
period during which the ﬁrst entry into cement production using within-state
raw materials occurred (if at all). Each row is associated with a diﬀerent de-
gree of reporting on raw materials for cement, ranging from no reference at
all to the results of tests for suitability for cement production being reported.
A separate entry is recorded for each report surveyed. This can mean mul-
tiple entries for a state. For example, three reports were viewed on Indiana
with one having no reference, one having a reference and one including test
results. Four reports are reported for Missouri, with three with references
and one with test results.
In 17 out of the 30 reports reviewed at least some reference was made to
raw materials for cement. Of the 13 reports with no reference, in two cases,
references were made in other reports for the same state. In a further seven
cases, the state cement industry either did not develop until after 1945 or
never developed. While the unsystematic nature of the sample limits the
conclusions that can be drawn, it does suggest possibly widespread interest
in locating raw materials for cement production during this period.
There is more evidence of State geological survey interest in the rapidly
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developing industry around 1900. In Arkansas and Alabama, it is claimed
such research directly led to ﬁrms developing raw materials identiﬁed in ge-
ological reports. The Indiana State Geologist actively searched for raw ma-
terials for the industry, with these searches being referred to in the trade
journal, Municipal Engineering. In another trade journal, Stone, Blatchley
states he discovered the location of some raw materials used by a new plant.
The United States Geological Survey (USGS) also regularly reported on
raw materials for cement production and on the cement industry in general.
From 1882, each USGS annual report includes short reports (which expanded
over time) on diﬀerent mineral industries, including the cement industry. In
addition, the 1882 and 1887 annual reports contain a substantial chapter
on “Useful Minerals of the United States”, listing, by state, locations of re-
sources, including cement rock, water-lime and hydraulic limestone. The
Cement chapters for 1909-1911, 1914, 1916 and 1923, list USGS and state
geological survey publications, as well as other sources, with information on
raw materials and the cement industry. These lists include 39 additional
USGS reports from between 1902 and 1913 including two large USGS Bul-
letins in 1905 and 1913 which outline at length (including maps and test
results) the location and nature of cement raw materials. Finally, the 1910
Cement chapter extensively discusses cement raw material locations.
There is further evidence of geological survey contributions as well as
university-industry links highlighted by David and Wright. John W. Eck-
ert worked on the Pennsylvania Geological Survey, while a student at Lehigh
University, Bethlehem Pa, before working for two early Portland cement man-
ufacturers in the Lehigh Valley (Lesley, 1924). Outside of the Lehigh Valley,
Professor Lord from Ohio State University, Professor Erasmus Haworth from
the University of Kansas, both associated with their state Geological Sur-
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veys, were associated with plants in these states. Professor Babcock from
the North Dakota State University, as well as that University’s President
started the ﬁrst plant in North Dakota in 1899. While a professor at Cor-
nell, S.B. Newberry assisted a nearby cement plant with quality problems
and then went to co-found a cement company at Bay Bridge, Ohio (Lesley,
1924). Academics also acted as consultants to the industry. Professor Schae-
fer, also from Cornell, tested cement at the Howes Cave, New York, plant.
Professor R.C. Carpenter also helped in further experiments there (Lesley,
1924). Robert Meade was an instructor in chemistry at Lafayette College at
Easton, Pa., who went from assisting local companies in the Lehigh Valley
to a nationally known consulting company. Finally, twelve universities (and
two academics including Professor Carpenter) are listed in the 1901 edition
of a cement directory as available for cement testing (Brown, 1901). How-
ever, there is no direct link to the universities and geological surveys with
the innovations that enabled the commercialization of the rotary kiln.
The dominance of the natural cement industry in 1890 cannot be at-
tributed to the geological surveys though. In Table 4 we compare, for each
state, the starting dates of the natural cement industry with the starting
dates of the ﬁrst geological survey. While the ﬁrst half of Table 4 demon-
strates that in nearly half of the states the industry developed after the
geological surveys began operation, 85% of natural cement production in
1890 was in states where the industry developed before the geological sur-
veys, including all of the major producing states of New York, Pennsylvania,
Kentucky and Indiana. Of the states that developed afterwards only Kansas,
Ohio, Minnesota and Wisconsin had developed sizeable durable natural ce-
ment industries by 1890. The second half of Table 4 demonstrates most
natural cement in 1890 is from states where entry accompanied the canals.
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Contemporary accounts and the experience of plants suggest the trans-
portation network could be important for the development of the industry.
Eckel (1905) in discussing the determinants of the value of raw materials, sug-
gests that a plant should be located near at least two transportation routes.
Supporting this is the experience of two plants. Distance from a railroad was
cited in Burkenroad (1979) as one of the factors contributing to the failure of
an early Portland cement works near San Diego. The opening of a plant at
Kingsport, Tennessee, is linked directly to the building of a railroad through
the area (Cement and Engineering News, 1916, January, p. 21).
Testing laboratories are identiﬁed in Lesley (1924) as another institution
important to the development of the industry. Lesley (1924) describes test-
ing laboratories as assisting American manufacturers to improve the qual-
ity of their cement which was lower than, in particular, German cement.
Furthermore, by allowing their conclusions to be used in advertising, these
laboratories also enabled local manufacturers to credibly signal their quality
improvement. Their credibility could have been established in a resource-
abundant economy — most likely during earlier debates about the nature of
steel which required extensive chemical testing (Misa, 1995).
4 Modelling institutional contributions to com-
petitive entry
The rise of the American portland cement industry featured substantial en-
try. While from 1870 to 1889 only 19 plants enter in nine states, from 1890 to
1899, 35 plants enter, including entry in eight new states, and between 1900
and 1913, 117 plants enter, including entry in 14 new states. The diﬀusion
of the coal-ﬁred rotary kiln and, to a lesser extent, demand growth, made
entry more proﬁtable across all states, but the importance of the additional
13
track and information provided by the surveys is likely to vary by region. So
to determine their systematic contribution, we analyze if entry by American
portland cement manufacturers was more likely in regions where there was
more rapid growth in railroads and where geological surveys provided infor-
mation on cement raw materials. The variables we use are deﬁned in Table
5, with more detail on their construction in an appendix.
4.1 Dependant Variable
To analyze entry we need to identify all possible sites where entry could
have taken place, and all entrants between 1889 and 1913. While it is not
possible to identify all possible sites with raw materials suitable for cement
production, as there have been no major scientiﬁc changes in what makes a
site useable for cement production, a good approximation is the set of all sites
where cement production occurred using local raw materials between 1889
and 2003. This was compiled using Cement chapters, industry directories
and other sources.
We consider entry at the county level in part to match the data we have
on raw material locations. There are just a few counties where there are
multiple entrants within our sample period.
We analyze entry for two periods: 1889 - 1899 and 1900 - 1913. As both
demand and technology changes dramatically between 1889 and 1913 it is
unlikely that there is a single model for this period. Likelihood ratio tests
for a reduced form probit conﬁrm this, always rejecting a single speciﬁcation
to an alternative two period speciﬁcation. We choose to break the sample
period at 1900 as this is when the coal-ﬁred rotary kiln becomes the techno-
logical standard and from then entry occurs in a broader set of states than
previously.
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Hence we deﬁne our dependant variable as follows:
E =
{
1 if at least one entry in the county occurs
0 otherwise
(1)
If entry does not take place, we construct all variables for the ﬁrst entrant
in a subsequent period e.g. we count the number of competitors that the
entrant would have faced at the end of the period, not when they do enter.
If all entry occurs before the end of the ﬁrst period, this county is dropped
for the second period. Hence we have 162 counties in the ﬁrst period and
149 counties in the second period.
4.2 Entry Model
The model begins with the idea that entry occurs in a market only if a
ﬁrm expects positive proﬁts from entry. Following the entry literature from
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) proﬁt is speciﬁed as the product of Variable
Proﬁt per unit sold and market size less entry costs. Proﬁt per unit sold
depends on demand, variable costs and competition. Entry costs include any
scale-free costs or beneﬁts of entry. This gives rise to the following equation
for a dummy variable for entry, E:
E =
{
1 if E(Π) = E(Variable proﬁt per unit ∗Market size− Entry costs) > 0
0 otherwise
(2)
As Variable Proﬁt per unit and Entry Costs are typically unavailable to
researchers, the literature since Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) replaces each
with a set of proxies.
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We adopt the functional form for Π used in Dranove et al. (2003):
Π = β0 + βp ∗ ln(Popt) +
∑
βvpXvp,t +
∑
βeXe,t (3)
where Xvp,t and Xe,t are sets of variables aﬀecting Variable proﬁt per
unit and entry costs for period t. Unlike Dranove et al. (2003) our unit of
observation is the county rather than the market, and we focus on initial
entry rather than market structure.
Many of the factors highlighted in the previous section aﬀected variable
proﬁts and entry costs. Before 1900, being near to crude oil is expected to
lower marginal costs and increase variable proﬁt per unit. Public geological
research is expected to reduce the costs of locating suitable materials for
a plant, and hence lower entry costs. More extensive railroads reduces the
costs of shipping fuel in and cement out and increases variable proﬁts.
As Dranove et al demonstrate we solve for the minimum market size
required for entry, or entry threshold, by setting Π equal to zero and solving
for the population, Pop∗, that solves the equation:
Pop∗ = exp(−(β0 +
∑
βvpXvp +
∑
βeXe)) (4)
Comparing the entry thresholds to actual market sizes and observing how
they change over time provides additional information as well as a check on
the validity of our model.
4.3 Explanatory Variables
We measure market size, as usually is done in similar entry models, using
population within the market area, Pop. There is limited information on
market areas. In the 1896 Cement chapter Spencer Newberry contrasts mills
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in Pennsylvania, New York and Ohio that supply large markets and mills
in other states that supply only local markets. Lesley (1911) describes how
markets for Portland cement ﬁrms shrunk from national to regional. We
approximate this by including all counties within 200 miles of the plant, as
used in Rosenbaum and Sukharomana (2001) and other recent work on the
cement industry. Though using one market size may seem not to match the
description by Newberry, in practice, as much of the population during this
period is concentrated in the northeast, it probably does not make much
diﬀerence.
The ﬁrst set of variables we consider are proposed to control for diﬀerences
in Variable proﬁt per unit. To control for diﬀerences in per-capita demand we
include measures of the share of the population living in urban areas, urbshr,
and population growth, popgrwth. Regions that are urbanized or rapidly
growing are expected to have greater demand for concrete and cement for
pavements, sewers and buildings.
To control for diﬀerences in competition we control for exposure to im-
ports, import, the number of ﬁrms producing portland cement, pc400, and
plants producing natural cement, nc400, within 400 miles of the plant. While
most ﬁrms have one plant, in the natural cement industry during the 1890s
there were cartels. However, to treat each cartel as a single plant would be
in some cases, because of the numbers involved, misleading as to their eﬀect.
Between 1889 and 1899, just over a third of potential entrants would have
either one or zero portland cement plants within 400 miles. Hence we in-
clude dummy variables for these cases to control for the greater proﬁtability
of entering into a monopoly, pcmon, or duopoly market, pcone.
In the ﬁrst period, when oil was required for commercial operation of the
rotary kiln, we control for the eﬀect of the availability of oil, with a dummy
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for counties near where fuel oil is produced, oil.
To control for the role of the transportation network the growth in railroad
mileage, rrdgr, is included. Growth rather than the level is used as we are
interested in entry rather than ﬁrm numbers and the level tends to be highly
correlated with population, making estimating a separate eﬀect diﬃcult.
The second set of variables capture the determinants of entry costs. The
ﬁrst variable, fmh, is a measure of the information provided by the geological
surveys. This variable is a dummy variable indicating if the county has been
identiﬁed as containing non-magnesian limestone or marl and if these re-
sources were subsequently used, or not. For example, if a county is identiﬁed
as having limestone but only marl is used, this suggests that the geological
survey information was not directly useful so the county is not recorded as
having had its raw materials identiﬁed. For the ﬁrst period, we use the in-
formation contained in the USGS publication “Useful Minerals of the United
States” for 1887. Though stated by the authors to be incomplete, and it
may draw on non-geological survey sources, because it was published by the
USGS, it is potentially available nationally and is the best source available
to us to capture the information known before 1890. For the second period,
we use the 1905 USGS Bulletin on the location of Portland cement materi-
als (Eckel, 1905). Though published after 1900, it clearly draws on earlier
sources.
We also include the number of years the geological survey had operated
continuously before the date of entry to allow for accumulated knowledge
and human capital in the geological survey itself, gsyrc. If these institutions
played important supporting roles, we would expect the coeﬃcients on these
variables to be positive and signiﬁcant.
Finally, we include a set of variables to control for other information that
18
ﬁrms may ﬁnd useful in choosing locations. In the ﬁrst period, we include
dummies for if there is a currently operating portland cement manufacturer
within 50 miles, locpc. Dummies for if there has previously been a portland
cement manufacturer in the county, prpc, and if there is or has been natural
cement production in the county without portland cement production, prnc,
are included in both periods. These variables, though, will also capture
lagged eﬀects of other causes, such as earlier geological research or growth
in railroad density. The number of years since 1780 that a county has been
settled, agectye, is included to control for other activities, like lime production
or quarrying that might also reveal information about raw materials.
With such a speciﬁcation we can identify if geological survey information
increased the likelihood of entry after controlling for diﬀerences in demand.
This will provide a kind of lower bound of the eﬀect of the institutions high-
lighted by David and Wright - as spatial variation cannot provide informa-
tion on those institutions whose eﬀects diﬀuse nationally. But if we cannot
identify a direct eﬀect of these institutions, it provides a serious question as
to their importance, and suggests that future work analyzing institutional
origins must either be cross-country or use very speciﬁc variation in time.
5 Econometric evidence
The results from estimating the entry model for the two periods are reported
in Table 6. First, we examine the controls for demand, competition and
costs. Of the demand variables, population growth, popgrwth has a positive
signiﬁcant eﬀect on proﬁtability (therefore reducing the entry threshold) for
1900-1913. Next, examining the competition variables, import has a positive
eﬀect, signiﬁcantly after 1899, consistent with this variable picking up de-
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mand eﬀects rather than competitive eﬀects. Consistent with expectations,
for 1889-1899 there are signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcients on dummies for lim-
ited competition, pcmon and pcone. Plausibly, the size of the coeﬃcient on
pcmon is larger than that on pcone. The number of competitors of both
types of cement signiﬁcantly aﬀects entry in both periods. Before 1900, low
numbers (less than eight) of portland cement manufacturers attracts entry.
Toivanen and Waterson (2005) also found that a rival’s presence in a market
can increase the likelihood of entry. Additional ﬁrms beyond eight reduces
the expected proﬁt from entry. For natural cement in the ﬁrst period, the
opposite pattern occurs. If a plant is not in range of the large clusters of
natural cement plants (Rosendale-Louisville-Lehigh Valley) then additional
natural cement plants makes entry less attractive. The eﬀects are largely
reversed in the second period. For 115 counties, the eﬀect of additional com-
petition on proﬁtability by portland cement manufacturers is negative. For
the remaining counties, mainly in the east and mid-east, the positive eﬀect
must be capturing demand eﬀects. For natural cement producers, the ef-
fect is switched, with low (less than 6) numbers attracting entry but larger
numbers (nearly exclusively in the east) now deterring entry.
Before 1900, the oil dummy has a signiﬁcant positive and substantial eﬀect
on entry. Speciﬁcally, this implies that if a plant is near an oil producing area,
the required market size is just 74% of what would otherwise be required.
This supports the contribution of cheap fuel oil to industry development
during this period.
Railroad growth is not close to signiﬁcant in either period, so we can
dismiss this as a systematic inﬂuence on the growth of the cement industry.
The geological survey variables also do not perform particularly well. For
the ﬁrst period, the coeﬃcient on the dummy for materials identiﬁed in
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the useful materials, fmh, is signiﬁcantly negative. This may be because
although areas with materials were known, entry was unproﬁtable due to
other economic factors not captured in our model (such as quality problems).
The proxies for the quality of the state organization, gsyrc and gsyrcsq in
total have a negative eﬀect except for those in seven states with current
geological surveys that had operated for at least 20 years. In the second
period, the results are mixed. While the sign on fmh is positive (with a p-
value of 0.102) it is not signiﬁcant. Furthermore as the size of the coeﬃcient
is much smaller than that on oil in the ﬁrst period, or prpc in the second
period, this suggests the eﬀect was relatively small. The combined eﬀect of
gsyrc and gsyrcsq is signiﬁcantly negative in nearly all cases. Hence, while
earlier evidence suggested the importance of geological surveys in Alabama,
Arkansas and Indiana, there is, at best, weak evidence that the geological
surveys systematically made it easier for initial entry into cement production.
This may be because these variables are relatively crude measures of the
contribution of these institutions, or that other complementary institutions,
such as testing laboratories or helpful local universities, were required for
successful entry.
Finally, we consider the eﬀects of previous economic activity on proﬁtabil-
ity. In both periods, the age of the county has a negative eﬀect for nearly all
counties, excluding twenty one in the plains and west in the ﬁrst period, and
a few counties in Oklahoma in the second period. This suggests that previous
activity does not so much reveal raw materials as produce other activities
that deter entry — perhaps not surprising for an industry requiring large
quarries. In the ﬁrst period, expected proﬁtability is signiﬁcantly increased
by previous natural cement production. The variables capturing previous
portland cement production have the expected signs but are not statistically
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signiﬁcant. This perhaps reﬂects the high failure rate of early entrants. In
the second period, existing or previous portland cement production has a
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on expected proﬁtability. In total, it seems, in a
ﬁnding similar to Toivanen and Waterson, that previous entry has a positive
signaling eﬀect, though in this case it is probably more about supply condi-
tions than demand conditions. Furthermore, it suggests that assessing the
role diﬀerent institutions played in early entry, rather than entry in general,
might yield additional insights about their importance.
In addition, we examine the predicted entry thresholds in Table 7. In the
ﬁrst panel, for each county, for each period, the predicted entry threshold
is compared with the actual market size for the entrant in that county. In
the second panel, for each period, whether entry occurred is matched up to
whether the market size population exceeded the predicted entry threshold
or not. In the ﬁrst panel, for the period after 1899, the entry thresholds are
fairly similar to the actual populations suggesting our model performs fairly
well. Before 1900 a substantial proportion of the estimated thresholds are
implausibly high. Nevertheless, the second panel of Table 7 shows that in
18 out of 23 cases where entry occurred, population exceeded the estimated
entry threshold. As Table 7 suggests entry thresholds were lower (for 128 out
of 149 counties) in the second period than the ﬁrst. These results suggest
that there was a general improvement in conditions for entry into the Port-
land cement industry after 1899. Because we are using proxies, we cannot
determine whether this was due primarily to lower entry costs, lower produc-
tion costs or greater demand. Contributions by institutions whose impacts
are less geographically speciﬁc, such as greater training of engineers with ex-
perience in testing (such as described in Slaton (2001)) may also contribute
to this.
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6 Conclusion
The rise of the American portland cement industry is another example of
how minerals abundance combined with innovation led to industrial success.
While falling prices and greater output suggest the successful adoption of
the rotary kiln, which could only occur in an oil-abundant economy, was the
major factor, there is qualitative evidence that suggests that the state geolog-
ical surveys and university-industry links, institutions highlighted in recent
work by David and Wright, were also important contributors. However, an
econometric analysis of entry by county, did not ﬁnd a systematic positive
relationship between industry development and resources being identiﬁed in
two US geological survey publications. There is also no systematic relation-
ship with the growth of railroad density. It may be the case that either
better measures of the contributions of these institutions are required, or
that complementary institutions such as university-industry links or private
testing laboratories were required for exploiting the resources identiﬁed by
the geological surveys.
Appendix: Construction of the Dataset
Plant Sites:
The primary set of data used is the identities, operating dates and raw
materials used by the 323 portland cement plants operating in the continen-
tal US between 1870 and 2003. For each year between 1890 and 2003, the
Cement chapter reports the number of portland and natural cement plants
operating in each state, or group of states. The identity of the plants op-
erating is determined using: accompanying lists of plants for certain years,
state reports published by the Bureau of Mines from 1952, and other sources
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including state geological surveys, company annual reports, industry directo-
ries, newspapers and trade journals. For our analysis we exclude plants not
using raw materials located at the kiln site, plants producing the specialty
product white cement, a few sites in which all entry occurred before 1889
and six sites for which it was diﬃcult to describe their potential market due
to their being on the water.
Cement: Annual natural, portland and puzzolan (a speciality cement)
cement production from 1880-1924 and by decade from 1818-1829 to 1870-
1879 is reported in the 1924 Cement chapter. The estimates from 1890 on
are based on surveys conducted by the US Geological Survey, with earlier
estimates made by chapter authors. Consumption is equal to imports plus
domestic production less exports. We follow the contemporary practice of
adding barrels unadjusted for diﬀerences in barrel sizes (which range consid-
erably from 240 pounds to 400 pounds) in the absence of detailed price data
enabling weighting of what were considerably diﬀerentiated products.
Market Size: Locational coordinates for the towns where the plants were
located are collected from the National Atlas of the United States and the US
Gazetteer online. For the counties, coordinates for central points, based on
2000 boundaries are collected from the Census 2000 Gazetteer of Locations
of Counties. For counties that did not exist in 2000, coordinates for coun-
ties that matched according to maps by Thorndale and Dollarhide (1987).
Indian Reservations in Oklahoma and South Dakota and Independent Cities
in Virginia are similarly treated. Bureau of the Census states that out of
3192 counties and Indian reservations, 2583 have had no signiﬁcant change
from 1880. The remaining 609 counties is an upper bound on the number of
problem counties, as mislocation of the centre of the county is only a problem
if the county is on the boundary of a market area.
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We construct market size as the sum of the populations in all counties
within 200 miles. A radius of 200 miles is used because the Census of Trans-
portation in 1977, which is the only comprehensive data on market sizes
available, suggests most cement shipments take place within this distance.
This distance has been used in other studies including that of Rosenbaum
and Sukharomana (2001) and studies cited therein.
Urbanization: We deﬁne an area within a county as urbanized if it is a
town or city and if its population is at least 8000. We compiled all such towns
from each of Census of Population and calculated the urban population for
each county. The ratio of urban population to total population is used to
calculate the urbanization rate.
Railroad Growth: We obtain railroad mileage by state from the Statistical
Abstract of the United States. State mileage is allocated by county using
county population shares. Finally, we aggregate the estimated mileage for
all counties within 200 miles of the plant. The estimated growth rate is the
exponential growth rate over the previous decade.
Import A county is deﬁned to face import competition if on the coast, the
Great Lakes, on or near the inland river system up to Kansas City, St. Louis,
Cincinatti, Columbus or Indianapolis (as indicated by contemporary reports)
or next to a customs district county on the coast, river or lake systems.
Oil Two oil ﬁelds are identiﬁed as producing fuel oil: Los Angeles and
Lima (which includes counties in Ohio and Indiana). Counties were identiﬁed
from Williamson, “American Petroleum”, and Oil chapters in USGS reports.
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ENDNOTES
1. All statistics reported in this section are compiled from the chapters on
cement found in United States Geological Survey (USGS) and Bureau of
Mines publications (hereafter referred to as Cement chapters).
2. This lead was temporary. By 1999, the United States produced about
only 5% of cement internationally, with China producing about 35%.
3. The head of the testing laboratory in Philadelphia in 1898 states “The
city is using to-day cement over 50 per cent stronger than that used during
1892, and a cost of from 50 to 60 cents per barrel less. Nearly every barrel
of this material is American cement” (statement by Richard L. Humphrey
in discussion accompanying Lesley (1898).
4. The Atlas Portland Cement Co. is the ultimate name of a series of ﬁrms
with the same principals that operate from 1885 as extensively described in
Hadley (1945).
5. Common terms for materials suitable for cement making.
6. Taﬀ (1902), Municipal Engineering, May, 1902, p. 311.
7. Blatchley (1901), Municipal Engineering, October, 1898, p. 264.
8. Stone, January, 1902, p. 37-38.
9. Though his aﬃliation is not stated, a Professor R.C. Carpenter was the
head of the Department of Experimental Engineering at Cornell University
in the 1890s (Selkreg, 1894, Chapter 19).
10. Geological survey starting dates are compiled from Socolow (1988).
State natural cement industry starting dates are compiled from USGS and
state geological survey reports, the United States Census of Manufactures,
and Cummings (1898).
11. Cummings (1898), Lesley (1924) and Hahn and Kemp (1994) have all
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made this point.
12. See Brown (1901), where ﬁfteen companies include test results from
laboratories, city engineerings and university professors.
13. Rosenberg (1985) also mentions their role in connection with cement
and concrete.
14. Standardization, identiﬁed by Anderson (1999) as a cause of the rise
occurred only after 1904, so is likely to mainly have contributed to the later
rise in demand though the discussion of Kelley (1923) suggests it may have
broadened the set of usable raw materials too. See Slaton (2001) for further
discussion of speciﬁcations in cement and concrete.
15. U.S. Bureau of the Census (1996)
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Table 1
STATE GEOLOGICAL SURVEYS
Census Year Started Operating
Region Years by 1890
Median Minimum Maximum Median Minimum Maximum
New England 1837.5 1830 1844 7.5 2 19
Middle Atlantic 1836 1835 1836 36 32 55
East North Central 1837 1837 1853 24 20 35
South Atlantic 1835 1823 1907 9 0 40
East South Central 1843 1831 1850 25.5 23 57
West North Central 1864 1853 1899 4 0 23
West South Central 1863.5 1857 1908 8 0 13
Mountain 1913 1866 1931 0 0 13
Paciﬁc 1890 1860 1911 1 0 26
Note: Paciﬁc excludes Alaska and Hawaii
Source: Socolow(1988)
Table 2
INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT
Year U.S. Portland Portland Natural Import Exports
cement cement cement cement cement
consumption price - real share share share mill. bbls
mill. bbls
1880 2.26 11.00 1.86 89.87 8.27 n.a.
1890 9.72 8.43 3.45 76.58 19.97 0
1902 27.38 4.86 61.70 29.38 7.17 0.34
1913 90.07 3.34 98.96 0.83 0.1 2.96
Note: Exports in 1891 used for 1890. Exports unavailable for 1880, 1890.
Source: Appendix
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Table 3
RESULTS OF REVIEW OF STATE GEOLOGICAL SURVEYS
Industry First development of the cement industry by state
Type of report never Industry developed
in survey develops By 1889 1890-1899 post-1913
No reference made LA,NH, CA(2),MN,WI,IN* NJ MS(2),NC(2)
VT
Reference made IN*,MI,MI*,MO(3)#, AR
OH*,PA(2)*,TN*,WI
Reference includes IN*,IA#,ME,MO#,
test results OH*
* Cement production already occurring in the state by the time of the survey
# Unknown if cement production already occurring
Source: Text
Table 4
NATURAL CEMENT INDUSTRY AND STATE GEOLOGICAL SURVEYS
Event States in 1890 Production
Producing Non-producing Share: 1890
State geological survey(SGS)
Entry before SGS GA,IL,IN,KY CO,CT,FL, 85%
commenced NM,NY,PA,WV NE,UT,WA
Entry within 10 years
of SGS
KS,MD,OH CA,ND 6%
Entry more than 10
years after SGS com-
mencing
MN,TX,VA,WI MI,TN 9%
Entry unknown IA,MO 0
Canals
Entry linked IL,IN,KY,MD, 87%
to canals NY,PA,VA,WV
Entry after canals OH CT 1%
With no link
No canals KS,MN,GA CA,CO,FL,IA,MI 12%
NM,TX,WI MO,NE,ND,TN,UT,WA
Source: Text
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Table 5
DEFINITIONS OF THE VARIABLES
Variable Description
Entry Dummy variable = 1 at least one entrant during the period
Pop State market size in millions
Demand
urbshr Ratio of urban population to total population
popgrwth Growth in population over the previous decade.
Competition and Costs
import Dummy variable equals 1 if county located on border (including Great
Lakes) or on river system accessible by imports (see Appendix for details)
pc400 Number of ﬁrms producing portland cement operating within 400 miles
nc400 Number of plants producing natural cement operating within 400 miles
pcmon Dummy variable equals 1 if no portland cement production occurring
within 400 miles (Period One only)
pcone Dummy variable equals 1 if one portland cement manufacturer
between 50 and 400 miles (Period One only)
oil Dummy variable equals 1 if county or a neighbouring county produces
fuel oil (Period One only)
Geological Surveys and Railroads
fmh Dummy variable equals 1 if a USGS publication identiﬁed raw materials
subsequently used (and no previous portland cement production)
gsyrc Number of years the state geological survey operating at
the time of entry had been conducted for.
rrdgr Growth in the mileage of railroad over previous decade.
Previous Economic Activity
prpc Dummy variable equals 1 if Portland cement production occurred in the
county before the current entrant. For period one, excludes currently
operating plants
prnc Dummy variable equals 1 if Natural cement production, and no Portland
cement production occurred in the county before the current entrant
locpc Dummy variable equals 1 if at least one portland cement manufacturer
within 50 miles (Period One only)
agectye Number of years the county (or its predecessor) settled since 1780
* Squared versions of these variables are used as well
Source: Text and Appendix
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Table 6
ENTRY MODEL
Variables 1889-1899 1900-1913
Dependant entry entry
Explanatory Coeﬃcients Standard Coeﬃcients Standard
Errors Errors
constant -9.481 ∗∗ 4.357 -1.654 1.150
lnpop 1.976 ∗∗ 0.962 0.801 ∗∗∗ 0.303
Demand
urbshr -10.982 9.907 5.363 4.303
urbshrsq 8.193 15.044 -7.859 5.919
popgrwth 40.460 61.952 54.870 ∗∗ 22.341
Competition and Costs
import 0.505 0.884 0.567 ∗ 0.345
pc400 1.320 ∗∗ 0.663 -0.175 ∗∗∗ 0.057
pc400sq -0.081 ∗∗ 0.035 0.003 ∗∗∗ 0.001
nc400 -0.255 ∗ 0.136 1.278 ∗∗∗ 0.378
nc400sq 0.011 ∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.124 ∗∗∗ 0.043
pcmon 7.159 ∗∗ 3.164
pcone 4.303 ∗ 2.380
oil 4.275 ∗∗∗ 1.670
Geological Surveys and Railroads
fmh -2.110 ∗ 1.102 0.472 0.288
gsyrc -0.122 0.085 -0.060 ∗∗ 0.026
gsyrcsq 0.003 ∗ 0.002 0.0008 ∗∗ 0.0004
rrdgr 6.031 56.591 -30.688 19.977
Previous Economic Activity
prpc 1.884 1.648 1.282 ∗∗ 0.564
locpc -0.741 1.091
prnc 5.341 ∗∗∗ 2.019 0.712 0.484
agectye 0.167 ∗∗ 0.075 0.024 0.020
agectyesq -0.002 ∗∗ 0.001 -0.0004 ∗∗ 0.0002
sample 162 149
Log likelihood -17.62 -70.48
∗∗∗= Signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level.
∗∗= Signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level.
∗= Signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level.
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Table 7
ENTRY THRESHOLDS
1889-1899 1900-1913
First Median Third First Median Third
Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile
Counties in which entry occurred
Population 2.46 9.09 10.12 1.85 6.19 10.12
Thresholds 0.34 2.14 4.72 0.70 2.12 4.68
Counties in which no entry occurred
Population 0.73 3.93 7.88 0.83 3.83 6.71
Thresholds 5.79 24.96 175.31 1.46 7.32 21.09
1889-1899 1900-1913
Entry No Entry Entry No Entry
Population > Threshold 18 1 61 18
Population < Threshold 5 138 14 56
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